Working in a Military Headquarters

Deployee Guide

Stabilisation Unit

October 2015

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

ACOS	Assistant Chief of Staff
ANSF	Afghan National Security Forces
ARRC	Allied Rapid Reaction Corps
BSOS	Building Stability Overseas Strategy
CA	Civil Affairs
CFT	Cross-Functional Team
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation/Coordination
CIS	Communications and Information System
CO	Commanding Officer
Comd/COM	Commander
COP	Common Operational Picture
COS	Chief of Staff
CSSF	Conflict, Stability and Security Fund
C2	Command and Control
DComd/DCOM	Deputy Commander
DCOS	Deputy Chief of Staff
DFID	Department for International Development
EU	European Union
FCAS	Fragile and Conflict-Affected States
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FP	Force Protection
GOC	General Officer Commanding
HMG	Her Majesty's Government
IJC	ISAF Joint Command
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ISTAR	Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance
JFC	Joint Force Commander
JOC	Joint Operations Centre
KLE	Key Leader Engagement
LEGAD	Legal Adviser
MOD	Ministry of Defence
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NSC	National Security Council
NSM	Non-Security Ministries
OC	Officer Commanding
OPLAN	Operation Plan
POLAD	Political Adviser
RoL	Rule of Law
SA	Situational Awareness
SME	Subject Matter Expert
SU	Stabilisation Unit
ToR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations

Introduction

The Stabilisation Unit (SU) is an integrated civil-military operational unit which reports to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Department for International Development (DFID), and the Ministry of Defence (MOD). It is designed to be agile, responsive and well-equipped to operate in high threat environments. It combines in-house staff expertise with the ability to draw on a larger pool of civilian expertise for specialised, longer term or larger scale taskings. It ensures lessons from practical experience are captured as best practice and used to improve future delivery by Her Majesty's Government (HMG).

Deployee Guides are to be read in the policy and resource context of HMG's: Building Stability Overseas Strategy; Conflict Pool; Conflict, Stability and Security Fund;[1] UK Approach to Stabilisation, and UK Principles for Stabilisation Operations and Programmes;[2] and other relevant guidance from HMG Departments. They are aimed primarily at the SU's own practitioners and consultants, and those of other HMG Departments. They are not a formal statement of HMG policy.

This Deployee Guide has been written for civilian staff being deployed by or through the SU to work in a military headquarters, either as part of a training exercise or in support of a military operation.[3] It is intended to provide practical advice on how best to prepare for such a deployment, and how to function comfortably and effectively within that unique and often complex environment. The guide is based primarily on the experiences and feedback of staff who have undertaken such deployments with NATO Headquarters, but the guidance and advice it contains will also have relevance to those intending to work with other international military formations, including those operating under the auspices of the United Nations (UN) and European Union (EU). Deployee Guides for working in the UN and EU have also been produced by the SU.[4]

The guide is directed at all civilian staff deploying to a military headquarters, including former military personnel and those working within a military environment for the first time. It is recognised therefore that some of the guidance may appear as obvious to those with greater experience in the area, and whilst this is unavoidable given the differing range of experience amongst potential users, every attempt has been made to avoid patronising tones and to relate guidance to specific feedback and lessons identified from previous deployments.

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[1] Announced in June 2013, for FY 2015-16, the £1 billion Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF, the successor to the Conflict Pool) pools new and existing resources across Government to prevent conflict and tackle threats to UK interests that arise from instability overseas. The National Security Council (NSC) will set priorities for the Fund, drawing on the most effective combination of defence, diplomacy, development assistance, security and intelligence.
[2] The UK Approach to Stabilisation and the UK Principles for Stabilisation Operations and Programmes can be found on the Stabilisation and Conflict Learning Resource under Publications at: sclr.stabilisationunit.gov.uk
[3] This paper has been written by Andy Kelly on behalf of the Stabilisation Unit.
[4] Ibid.

A summary of the major lessons identified and discussed is set out at Annex B. The summarised format is designed to provide staff with an easy-to-use checklist of actions they should consider as they prepare for and progress through future deployments, and includes cross-references to the relevant sections of the main guide. It is recommended however that the guide be read in full in order to gain a more detailed understanding of the environment and issues likely to be encountered in a military headquarters, and how to deal with them. Deployees needing more detailed information on UK policy relating to their deployment should ask SU staff for relevant points of contacts in HMG Departments.

Feedback on this Deployee Guide can be sent to the SU Lessons Team at: SULessons@stabilisationunit.gov.uk.

Stabilisation Unit Publications

The Stabilisation Unit produces a number of publications in order to inform key stakeholders about a range of topics relating to conflict, stability, security and justice. The publications can be found at our new Publications web page.

A brief introduction to the different series and existing titles is below.

Stabilisation Series

Core guidance on the UK perspective on stabilisation; how it should be delivered.

The UK Approach to Stabilisation (2014)
The UK Principles for Stabilisation Operations and Programmes
Security Sector Stabilisation

Issues Note Series

Short papers aimed at policy makers, programme managers and deputy heads of mission to inform them about key issues in thematic areas.

Analysis, Planning and Monitoring and Evaluation

What Works Series

These are long paper intended for programme managers, project officers and deployees. They include detailed tools and frameworks that can be applied to thematic or programmatic areas.

Policing the Context
Analysis
Planning
M&E

Deployee Guide Series

Practical guidance intended for first time or seasoned deployees.

United Nations Missions
EU CSDP
Military Headquarters
OSCE

Preparations for Deployment

A deployment to a military headquarters can be a hugely rewarding experience for civilian staff, offering unique insights into military thinking, planning, and activities, while working at the heart of an international military operation. The input, influence, and contributions of civilian staff in these roles can have an immediate and direct impact on military planning and activities, helping shape the military mission and greatly enhancing stability operations.

Civilian experts are increasingly being deployed to work within military headquarters on both training exercises and operations, where they provide support and advice directly to military staffs and commanders. This support and advice can encompass a broad range of functions and expertise, and can be delivered at a variety of locations. The growing tendency for international, coalition-style interventions means that most military headquarters employing civilian experts are now multinational in nature, and usually form a component of large international organisations such as NATO, UN, or the EU. Roles undertaken by SU staff in such headquarters have included Stabilisation Planners, Stabilisation Advisers, Analysts, Humanitarian Advisers, Liaison Officers, and Exercise Support Staff. Missions employing these staff have included the NATO ISAF Headquarters, ISAF Joint Command (IJC) headquarters in Kabul, ISAF Regional Command (South West) in Helmand, and Headquarters Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) exercises in the UK and overseas.

There is a now general consensus that civilian deployments of this nature serve to enhance and facilitate the integrated approach.[5] However, for staff embarking on such deployments, the transition from a civilian working environment to that of a military headquarters can be difficult, with many describing the experience as something of a 'culture-shock'. An analysis of feedback from those returning from such deployments has highlighted a number of reasons for this, and identified lessons which might help to improve the transition and early effectiveness of those deploying in the future. This Guide draws on such feedback and lessons, along with input from military colleagues and commanders, to provide practical advice for civilian staff preparing for deployment. Most of the guidance is relevant to deployment on both exercises and operations, although a specific section on military exercises is included.

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[5] In UK terms, the Integrated Approach (as promoted by the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review) refers to people from different institutions (with particular reference to civilian and military institutions) working together at several levels to achieve common aims. An integrated approach recognises that no one Government Department has a monopoly over responses to the challenges of conflict and stabilisation contexts and that by making best use of the broad range of knowledge, skills and assets of Government Departments, integrated efforts should be mutually reinforcing. The intent behind HMG's shift from "comprehensive" to "integrated" approach in 2010 therefore was to establish greater cross-Government collective analysis, leading to more coherent strategy development, followed by collective operational delivery of HMG, rather than Departmental priorities delivered in siloes. Other governments and international organisations (e.g. NATO and EU) sometimes use "whole of government" or "comprehensive" to describe similar collaboration.

Stabilisation Awareness

Civilian staff are deployed by SU to a military headquarters because they offer knowledge and expertise not available within the military staffs. This relates not only to specific functional areas, but also to a broader understanding of the range of responses to conflict environments articulated in the Building Stability Overseas Strategy and, specifically in relation to stabilisation. Civilian staff can also significantly enhance relationship-building between military and non-military organisations, through their understanding of the differing aims and perspectives of various stakeholders. Military commanders are clear in their feedback that for civilian staff to enhance the integrated approach, add value, and maintain credibility within a military headquarters, they must possess and display a greater understanding of stabilisation theory, practice, and perspectives than their military colleagues. They will generally be assumed to be Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) in the area, and be expected to provide guidance and advice at short notice, and should therefore be sufficiently flexible and informed to deal with such situations. **An important preparation for any deployment therefore is to refresh knowledge and understanding of key stabilisation principles and policy, and be up to date with latest thinking and developments ahead of departure.**

Military Familiarisation

There is strong evidence to suggest that even a basic pre-understanding of military culture, jargon, and structures can greatly reduce the learning curve and 'shock of capture' when arriving in a military headquarters. A simple understanding of military formations, organisation and rank structures, and common abbreviations can all help to enhance the early credibility and effectiveness of a new civilian deployee. An ability to recognise ranks through the various badges and insignia worn by military personnel may also assist civilian staff when dealing with military colleagues within the headquarters. Links which may assist in all of this are contained in the resources section at Annex A, supplemented by an overview of structures, key staff, and military formations at Annex C, and a glossary of commonly used military terms at Annex D**. For staff with no prior experience of working in a military environment there is great benefit to be gained from undertaking some form of military familiarisation training or education ahead of deployment.** This can include participation in military exercises and pre-deployment training, military induction sessions, and visits to UK-based headquarters or recently returned units. The SU should be able to suggest, and possibly arrange, suitable military familiarisation opportunities for core SU staff and selected Deployable Civilian Experts, together with participation in military exercises and training events.

Personal Motivation and Contribution

Staff volunteer to work with military organisations for a variety of personal and professional reasons, and offer a wide range of individual strengths and experience to the organisation. Sometimes, however, deployments can fail to meet these individual aspirations, and staff

can feel that their particular strengths and experience are under-utilised. **It is important that deployees reflect on their own particular motivations for undertaking such a role, and the strengths and experience they bring to the headquarters. They should ensure from the outset that the post in question actually offers what they seek, and highlight to military colleagues and managers the strengths and experience they can offer. They should remain clear on what they wish to put into, and get out of, the experience, and regularly review progress against these aspirations throughout the deployment.**

Role Specific Preparation

In addition to the more general preparation above, staff should focus carefully on the specific role they are being deployed to undertake. Civilian deployments to military headquarters are often initiated with relatively vague job descriptions, with the expectation that individuals will develop the role when they arrive. As one military line manager described it: "We know that we need civilian experts if we are to achieve the integrated approach, but we are not sure at the outset what precisely they will be doing." Notwithstanding this potential ambiguity, feedback from previous deployees suggests there are a number of areas where robust levels of research and consultation ahead of deployment will enhance early effectiveness in post, and reduce the likelihood of friction and frustration on arrival. These are discussed below.

Military Headquarters

It is important that staff arrive with at least a basic understanding of the organisation in which they are to work. Staff should establish a clear understanding of the role and mission of the military headquarters to which they are being deployed, its composition, and how it fits within the broader military hierarchy and stabilisation community**. Most important is understanding how J3, J5 and J9 fit together (or do not, on occasion) and, most crucial of all, understanding the importance of J5 and J3/5, which refines plans before their execution by J3, and the relationship between the two. (See Annex C.)** The involvement of SU personnel in the planning room from the very first J5 whiteboard sessions is critical. It is very hard to change the course of a military planning process once it is underway – and by the time it hits J3/5 the plan's underlying assumptions may be very hard to challenge. Generalist (and often specialist) civilian advisers must become involved with J5 and J3/5 in particular. There will be a tendency in military headquarters to push civilian advisers towards the J9 branch as their 'proper' home. Clearly, a good working relationship with J9 is important because of its remit, but it should not be an exclusive linkage or even the primary one. And the singleton (or the senior) Stabilisation Adviser must become a trusted voice in the Command Group. **Wherever possible, this basic knowledge should be supplemented by a more in-depth grasp of the organisation to which the headquarters belongs, the policies and plans of the headquarters itself, assessments of performance to date, rotation details, and any recent media reporting on the organisation.** Information can often be found online, with many headquarters now having their own sites on social media.

But discussion with predecessors in the post, and/or others who have recently worked within the headquarters or had dealings with it, will provide a broader perspective on prevailing policy, culture, and issues. SU should be able to assist with research, and provide appropriate contacts to facilitate such discussion.

Location, Context and Geo-Political Background

Equally important to an understanding of the military headquarters and its mission, is an understanding of the context and environment in which it will operate. **Staff should develop a good overall understanding of the country and region to which they are to deploy, its history and culture, and the current political, security, and stabilisation situation, including the UK's broader, long term aims.** Such information can be obtained through a wide variety of sources, ranging from press and media articles to more detailed country information available from SU and Whitehall Departments. Again, discussion with predecessors and/or those recently returning from the locality can be of huge value in developing a greater understanding of recent developments, issues, and priorities.

UK Stakeholders

To provide optimum value within a military headquarters, as part of the integrated approach, a clear understanding of UK aims and objectives, and of the various stakeholders and their perspectives, is essential. A major lesson from previous deployments is that identification and engagement with UK stakeholders (primarily Whitehall Departments) ahead of departure is necessary to establish early cooperation and unity of purpose, with a particular emphasis on:

- Developing a better understanding of UK stakeholder politics, perspectives and priorities;
- Resolving differences of opinion and achieving consensus on the role of the deployee and the nature of his/her interfaces with local stakeholders;
- Facilitating and supporting subsequent engagement with local representatives of UK stakeholders on arrival, and identification of other stakeholders with whom contact should be made.

Prior to deployment, staff should therefore identify and engage with UK stakeholders to ascertain perspectives and gain support for the role. Wherever possible, areas of friction or concern should be discussed with SU in order to achieve resolution ahead of deployment. It is important to depart with a clear understanding of UK Government plans and priorities for the area concerned, and a consensus on Terms of Reference (TOR) which reflect this.

Living Conditions

Living conditions on deployment and exercise can vary greatly, from multi-person tents, or cabins in a ship, with shared-facilities through to individual en-suite accommodation in hardened buildings. Working conditions, food, leisure and welfare facilities can also vary

considerably depending on the location and nature of the headquarters. The time available for resolution of domestic issues and undertaking basic personal administration can be severely restricted by the battle rhythm of the headquarters (see below), and parcels can take some time to arrive if clothing or equipment is ordered by post. **Staff should therefore ensure that they fully understand the level of accommodation and facilities available ahead of departure, and take clothing and personal equipment appropriate to those conditions.** SU strive to make staff aware of conditions pertaining to all positions, but particularly where such conditions are deemed to be difficult, and may also provide appropriate 'kit lists'. Discussions with predecessors and/or other staff with experience of the location will also assist in ensuring proper preparation in this area. Staff should also carefully manage the expectations of their families as the frequency of communications, as many headquarters will have limited bandwidth and access to telephones suitable for personal calls. It is very important, therefore, to communicate beforehand to people at home that if you are not in touch for extended periods it is normal and no particular cause for concern.

Risk Management and Duty of Care

It is <u>essential</u> that staff fully understand and review the various risks and mitigation strategies relating to their specific deployment. Within a military headquarters such risks can range from direct enemy attack to adverse climatic conditions and local health concerns, and all identified risks will be contained within the Risk Matrix document routinely prepared and issued by SU ahead of departure. Deployees will normally operate under FCO duty of care arrangements, which may restrict use of military transport without appropriate training - MASTIFF and other similar armoured personnel carriers require specialised roll-over training; helicopters over water/at night oblige you to attend the Dunker course for underwater escape training – and require the services of contracted close protection teams when travelling outside of the headquarters. Such arrangements will be covered by the SU Risk Matrix, but can present particular challenges when coordinating moves with military colleagues who will have their own travel and security arrangements. **Staff should ensure they have received, reviewed, and discussed their individual risk matrix with SU ahead of departure, adhere to it, and continuously review and update the document as required throughout their tenure in post. Gaining the necessary training and qualifications to travel on certain types of military transport in advance of deployment is also highly advisable. Particular attention must be paid to travel and close protection requirements, which should be carefully explained to, and coordinated with, military colleagues.**

What to Expect

There is no single 'model' for a military headquarters; each will vary in its size, structures and procedures depending on many factors including ownership, mission, national make-up and lead nation, as well as the leadership style and preferences of its Commander (UK) – or Commanding General (US). Nor will the organisation of any single headquarters remain

static; structures and procedures will evolve and change as lessons are learned, personnel change, and new ideas are introduced. Knowledge of, and compliance with, military doctrine on stabilisation and other related issues will vary, with some headquarters following it slavishly whilst others perceive it as more of a broad guide on which to shape their policies and procedures. Notwithstanding this, feedback from deployees has identified some key aspects of working in a military headquarters which remain fairly consistent across the board, and which will almost certainly be encountered by future civilian deployees wherever they are located. Feedback has also identified some of these as the main factors contributing to the initial 'culture shock' experienced by civilian deployees on arrival in a military headquarters, and they are therefore discussed in some detail below.

Organisational Structures

Military organisational structures are universally hierarchical, based on very clear chains of command, and underpinned by a rigid rank structure. The flow of information and advice up those chains of command, to inform decision-making at the highest levels, is tightly controlled, and adherence to the guidance and direction coming down the chains is absolute. This can clearly frustrate civilian staff used to operating in more flat and flexible organisations, particularly when they see their own expert functional advice pass through several layers of military 'scrutiny' before it reaches the intended decision-maker. However, any attempt to 'short-cut' the chain of command can result in military line managers becoming unsighted on key issues, a loss of corporate clarity and 'joined-up' advice, and a fracturing of trust and team cohesion. **To maintain effectiveness and credibility within a military headquarters it is essential to understand, and work within, the appropriate chain of command.** Part of the gift of civilians is, however, a degree of ambiguity, and to fall entirely in line with military hierarchies risks disempowering you and may make your job more difficult rendering you less effective. However, that is not the same as keeping the chain of command informed about all your activities, including if you are going to talk to someone higher up or outside of your chain.

Understanding and recognising military ranks can be particularly difficult in a multinational headquarters, with different ranks, terminology, and insignia being used by individual nations and Services (Navy, Army, and Air Force). To assist in this, links to charts showing the rank structures and insignia for all 3 Services across all NATO nations can be found in the resources section at Annex A. A quick internet search-engine trawl should provide similar information for non-NATO countries.

Military command structures will vary by campaign and are generally fairly complex. Most military headquarters will now be joint organisations, comprising elements of all 3 services although some single-service headquarters may remain. Whilst terminology and process may differ between services, the lessons and issues identified in this guide will generally be pertinent to both joint and single-service headquarters. Almost without exception, however, Western military interventions are conducted by joint forces (i.e. involving air, or air and

naval, as well as ground forces) often at several campaign levels, namely strategic, operational and tactical. In a complex theatre such as Afghanistan or Iraq there will be a 4* HQ at the strategic/operational level, and one or more 3* HQs (corps level) operational HQs with subordinate 2* divisional and 1* brigade formations. It is also worth noting that the hierarchy of HQs may be in totally different locations/countries/or at sea and that in a coalition/joint environment you may see alternative national and military nomenclature. Smaller theatres require less complex arrangements: the UK operation in Sierra Leone for example was conducted at 1* (brigade HQ) level. A general overview of the structures and branches which might be encountered in a military headquarters is at Annex C, along with the roles of key staff within the headquarters and where they might interact with civilian deployees. It should be noted that there will generally be a number of civilian staff employed within a military headquarters, in a range of planning, analytical, and advisory roles, who can provide a good source of information and advice and perhaps act as an informal 'sounding-board' for discussion of ideas and concerns. **New staff should ensure that their induction to a military headquarters includes visits to and/or briefings from the staff branches outlined at Annex C, to enhance their early understanding of headquarters business, processes, and procedures.**

Battle Rhythm

Despite the war-like terminology, this relates to the manner in which a headquarters conducts its business, and in particular the routine cycle of meetings and briefings at which information is exchanged and decisions are made at all levels of command. A typical multi-national military headquarters will be operating an extremely busy and intense 24/7 battle rhythm, with just a half-day rest or low tempo period each week. This battle rhythm results in a crowded schedule and drives the work of all staff as they seek to produce information and briefing material in very tight timeframes to inform the relevant meetings and decision makers. The battle rhythm of any military headquarters is generally deemed to be inflexible, driven by operational needs, and results in long working hours for the staff. It is, however, the manner in which the work of the headquarters is conducted, and **civilian staff must therefore quickly understand the battle rhythm, and work within it, to ensure that they maintain appropriate levels of awareness, and attend the right meetings with the right levels of information and advice.** Experience has shown that failure to conform to the battle rhythm can result in the marginalisation of individuals and their inputs, no matter how good they and their material may be. Where busy or conflicting schedules preclude attendance at key meetings, staff should provide early warning and apologies and wherever possible arrange alternative attendance. Within the battle rhythm it is useful to figure out what are the main meetings that summarise the important and pertinent information. For civilians, most of the dividends (outside of their branch meetings) will generally be to sit in on (or tune/listen into, IT permitting) the update briefings that happen for the commander at the beginning and end of the day.

A common concern expressed by deployees in military headquarters is that the battle rhythm is so busy and all-consuming that it can result in a loss of perspective and preclude longer term or more considered thought. This has been overcome by individuals scheduling (and rigorously protecting!) periods within their diary for strategic 'thinking time', often undertaken away from the office in locations where interruption is less likely. In circumstances where the battle rhythm is deemed to be so intense that it precludes effective contributions, or where it threatens the health/resilience of staff, the matter should obviously be raised with line management. Civilians must be able to prioritise their daily work and be sufficiently thick-skinned to ignore the occasional jibe about 'desk time.' For many in the military spending grindingly long hours at one's desk in the HQ is a visible sign of application and commitment – and it also often unavoidable given the workload involved. Civilian advisers need to recognise that this is a military trait and any resulting tensions are best defused with politeness and good humour. Individual civilian advisers cannot attend all the numerous planning and coordination meetings they wish to or have been invited to. Their priority of effort must be concentrated on influencing outcomes affecting their sphere of interest and the text of relevant key documents. A willingness to network around the branches to keep one's finger on the pulse of the various plans in train is essential.

Briefings and Presentations

The primary means of delivering information and advice to senior military commanders is through briefings – almost invariably delivered as PowerPoint Presentations. Each headquarters will have a set format for such presentations, and they are generally very time-constrained. Whilst it is recognised that this is not the ideal manner in which to try and communicate complex stabilisation or other civilian issues, the demands of the battle rhythm often offer little alternative. Perhaps because of this, there is a strong military preference for key information and advice to be presented in bullet-point and diagrammatic formats, with clear options and recommendations included where relevant. **Civilian staff should develop their presentational skills and distil advice and briefings into a clear, concise, and easily digestible format, utilising bullet-points and diagrams wherever possible and appropriate. Some proficiency in PowerPoint is likely to prove helpful, although staff should resist use of PowerPoint where they deem it to be an inappropriate means of communicating their message or influencing their audience.** Even if you have a regular slot in an update brief, <u>do not always try to fill it</u> because that will risk antagonising other participants. When appropriate, it is perfectly legitimate to say "no points, no slides". But if you are giving a short update, expect to be questioned by the Commander and have the details to hand. These meetings are much about establishing and maintaining your reputation and credibility in the headquarters as they are about information.

Even routine updates to senior military staff tend to have a formality and tight timeframe not generally encountered in civilian organisations. Civilian staff should be prepared for this and try to obtain a 'steer' from military colleagues on the style and standards expected, and

how best to inject ideas and influence within a particular headquarters or with a particular officer. In this context it is important to remember that input and advice from civilian staff is as critical as that from any other element of the headquarters, and they should not allow the formality (and what some deployees have described as the intimidating atmosphere) of military meetings and briefings deter them from providing such input. Staff should be prepared to challenge ideas and proposals, but wherever possible should do so at an early point rather than wait until the final stages of a proposal, when criticism or adverse comment can be far less welcome. Similarly, wherever possible, serious disagreements with senior military officers should be addressed in private in order to present a unified civilian-military face to headquarters staff and other stakeholders. Unlike the civilian world, to seriously and publicly challenge or argue with a senior military commander can undermine trust and result in a complete breakdown in relations with military colleagues.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

In addition to the multitude of generic military acronyms and abbreviations, each headquarters and each operation will have its own particular set, which will grow rapidly as the operation progresses. This can be confusing and sometimes overwhelming for the new civilian deployee, but quickly becomes part of their everyday language. **New arrivals should ask for a list of acronyms and abbreviations on arrival (there is almost always one available) and always ask for an explanation of those they do not understand.** On occasion acronyms are so engrained that even military colleagues no longer remember their actual definition! Lists of commonly used acronyms and abbreviations are included in Annex A and a glossary of commonly used military terms is at Annex D.

Military Understanding of Role and Function of Civilian Staff

This will vary greatly depending on the nature of the roles and functions being undertaken, the maturity of those roles, and the mission and composition of the headquarters itself. Experience has ranged from civilian staff who have felt marginalised and under-utilised through a poor military understanding of what they can offer, to those who have felt well integrated and fully valued from the outset. Some former staff have reported a sense of shock at the views and opinions held by military colleagues on stabilisation and development issues, which were very different from those of the civilian community. Anticipating areas of potential misunderstanding, and early briefings on civilian roles and functions to newly arrived military staff, can sometimes help in these areas. There is often however a natural institutional friction between military staff focused on short-term military objectives, and civilian staff whose outlook covers a much longer time horizon in terms of stabilisation and other civilian activities; in this respect it is often necessary to manage the expectations of military staff on what can realistically be achieved within their relatively short tenure in the region. To assist in this, it can be helpful to identify and highlight those areas where some form of tangible, visible outcome can be achieved by the military unit during its tour, and to help them plan for this whilst emphasising the much longer-term

nature of other aims and activities. **Civilian staff should not assume a full understanding of their role and function amongst all military staff within a headquarters. They should anticipate a lack of understanding and be prepared to counter any lack of engagement or disinterest with clear briefings/explanations of why they are deployed, what they can offer in support of the headquarters' mission and integrated/comprehensive approach, and the realities of what can be achieved by military forces in the timeframes available.** However, it is also important not to dismiss or under-estimate the level of military understanding of stabilisation and other civilian-led activities. We now have a generation of military personnel at all ranks with wide experience of supporting and delivering stabilisation effect in cooperation with other agencies, and whilst such experience may result in a somewhat restricted view of stabilisation, based primarily on Afghanistan or Iraq, many military officers now supplement such experience with broader stabilisation training and formal qualifications.

Military Rotations/Roulements

Any operational military headquarters will comprise one or more military units, each of which will serve a set-period of time in situ depending on national policy. UK and European units tend to serve six months, whilst US Forces are generally deployed for 12-15 months. At the end of this period the unit will move out and be replaced by a new one, a process generally known as Rotation, Roulement, or RIP (Roulement or Relief in Place). This can have a major impact on the headquarters, particularly where a large proportion, or indeed all, of the military staff rotate at the same time. The headquarters will undoubtedly suffer a period of disruption and settling, there will be a loss of continuity and corporate knowledge, and the incoming unit will bring in new ideas, priorities, and procedures. There is therefore clear advantage to be gained from having civilian staff remain in post during a rotation, in order to maintain a degree of continuity and corporate knowledge within the headquarters, to provide early support and advice to incoming staffs based on experience and local knowledge, and to guard against inappropriate or damaging activities driven by the inexperience or over-enthusiasm of recently arrived military staff. **Where possible civilian staff should synchronise their own leave and redeployment plans to remain in post during and immediately after a military rotation/Roulement.**

It should be recognised also that the '6 weeks on, 2 weeks off' cycle pertaining to some SU civilian deployments can cause difficulties within a military headquarters, not least because military personnel will only normally get one period of 2 weeks' leave (often referred to as R&R – Rest and Recuperation) in 6 months. It is also worth noting that if they are deployed in a shipborne HQ, there may be no opportunity for taking leave during an operational deployment. Military Line Managers have highlighted the absences of key staff through what they see as very generous leave arrangements as a major disadvantage, and civilian staff should be prepared for adverse comments of this nature during their tenure in post. These leave arrangements are, however, a condition of service, and whilst some flexibility is

possible, they must be adhered to. SU sponsors should be contacted should difficulties arise with military colleagues due to civilian leave cycles.

Performance at Post

Lessons drawn from previous deployments have highlighted the following practical measures which civilian staff might take to develop their role and enhance their effectiveness during their tenure in a multi-national military headquarters.

Regular Review of Role and Duties

The dynamic political and military nature of multinational interventions can result in a constantly changing environment to which civilian deployees must adapt if they are to maintain optimum effectiveness. Such change can range from a slow and subtle shift of emphasis to a sudden reversal of policy direction, but in all cases it is **important that staff review on a regular basis their role within the organisation, to ensure that it remains consistent with current policy and intent, and fully utilises their time and expertise. Proposed changes to Terms of Reference should be discussed with line management and the SU sponsor.**

Experience in previous deployments and exercises has shown that opportunities can sometimes arise for civilian staff to assist the broader stabilisation/training effort in areas well outside of their original terms of reference, due to their particular experience, location, or availability. Staff should consider such opportunities carefully, and in particular any impact they may have on core roles and responsibilities. Where such opportunities do arise, and do not impact adversely on core responsibilities, they should be pursued in consultation with Line Management and SU. Similarly, staff should recognise that they have a key role in helping shape military activities though robust input of their advice and ideas, and can positively influence military thinking by introducing and sharing fresh perspectives relevant to the overall mission.

> In 2011, SU-deployed civilian Stabilisation Planners in ISAF Joint Command HQ (IJC) identified an absence of joint central planning between Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and Non-Security Ministries (NSM), and a reluctance to share existing plans. The consequent lack of coordination, cooperation, and trust between these organisations was having a detrimental impact on overall stabilisation efforts in Afghanistan. To help remedy this situation, the planners met with senior ANSF and NSM personnel to explain the benefits of joint planning and an integrated approach to stabilisation efforts. They then initiated and supported a series of detailed planning meetings between ANSF and NSMs. The outcome was inclusion of a formal stabilisation and development component within the ANSF Campaign Plan, developed in conjunction with NSMs and endorsed by them, paving the way for a more integrated approach to Afghan-led stabilisation activity.

Performance appraisal and review is as important on deployment as it is in any other post. Equally important is that staff utilise their experience in post to provide feedback and lessons which SU can use to continuously improve the levels of support and advice it provides to deployees. Returning deployees have highlighted the benefits of recording issues and lessons as they occur, rather than trying to remember them all at the end of a busy and eventful deployment. Contact details for the SU lessons team are included in the resources section of this guide. **Staff should ensure that local line management arrangements are in place for completion of performance appraisal reports, and maintain an ongoing record of issues and lessons to inform their end of tour debrief with the SU.**

Review of Position within the HQ

As highlighted earlier in this guide, at the initial stages of a deployment the full nature and value of a civilian post may not be fully understood by military staff within a headquarters, and as a consequence it may be poorly positioned within the organisation i.e. located in the wrong branch or under inappropriate line management. Similarly, a changing situation or environment may render it sensible to consider a change in the organisational position of a post part-way through a deployment. **Staff should periodically review their organisational position within the headquarters, in particular its consistency with their core role, the influence and access it provides, and its profile within the organisation. Proposed changes should be discussed with line management and the SU sponsor.**

Local Stakeholder Engagement

Building on the UK stakeholder engagement undertaken as part of the preparation recommended above**, local stakeholder identification and engagement should be undertaken at the very early stages of a deployment**. Local stakeholders will vary greatly depending on the role and function being undertaken, but will include internal elements of the military mission, and external entities such as International, UK, and Host Nation Government Departments and Agencies, NGOs, PRTs, Civil Society representatives etc. A properly integrated approach requires a clear understanding of all these stakeholders and their individual perspectives, and that they in turn understand the aims and objectives of the military organisation concerned.

Experience has shown that it is often civilian staff working within a military headquarters who become the natural conduit for this communication between military and civilian stakeholders, but that engagement with some civilian stakeholders can be difficult and strained due to misconceptions about the military role in supporting civilian activities. This can be a particular problem when dealing with humanitarian agencies, who may seek to avoid any contact or cooperation with military forces due to concerns that such engagement may threaten or undermine their neutral and impartial status. Overcoming such concerns and tensions requires understanding, patience and diplomacy, but is a critical part of the stakeholder engagement process. It is important too that military colleagues are made aware of the particular concerns and prejudices of civilian stakeholders, in order that they

can shape their engagements and activities in an appropriate manner. Wherever possible staff should seek to 'institutionalise' their stakeholder engagement, by securing regular attendance at stakeholder meetings, and inviting stakeholders to form part of military planning teams etc. Building robust and routine stakeholder engagement into the battle rhythm of a headquarters is a major step towards achieving the integrated approach.

Key Leader Engagement (KLE) is the term used to describe meetings between senior military staff and senior members of the local stakeholder community, and most military headquarters will run a very busy KLE schedule in order to maintain local cooperation and cohesion at the highest levels. These engagements offer great opportunities for delivering key messages and gaining insights into senior stakeholder views and perspectives, and **civilian staff should therefore support KLE through comprehensive pre-briefing to commanders, ensuring that all relevant issues are discussed, messages conveyed, and information obtained**. It may, however, sometimes be necessary to try to dissuade military commanders from undertaking KLE when it is considered inappropriate to their role or mission, or which cuts across the efforts of other stakeholders. Such discussions will need to be undertaken with tact and care and backed with sound reasoning, as most senior commanders see KLE as a major component of their duties.

Stakeholder Cohesion and Cooperation

Representing a multinational military headquarters in a widespread stakeholder engagement process can provide an excellent overview of activities being undertaken by a wide range of players. This has been particularly important in locations such as Afghanistan, where the busy and cluttered stabilisation arena has contained a large number of organisations pursuing differing objectives, leading to a lack of coherence and linkages. In such circumstances civilian staff on previous deployments have been able to utilise their unique overviews to help bring more coherence to stakeholder activities, including the mapping of activities to develop (in military terminology) a 'Common Operational Picture' of the environment, which was then shared with other stakeholders. This process highlighted where activities were complimentary to each other, and identified areas where military support might be appropriate (or entirely inappropriate), and so often drove the military planning process. In some cases it also identified poor cohesion between external stakeholders, and provided the start-point for resolution of such issues. **Where appropriate, staff should consider utilising stakeholder engagement to develop a 'map' or 'Common Operational Picture' of stakeholder activities, to highlight areas for potential military support and identify risks arising from poor cohesion/cooperation amongst stakeholders.**

On arrival at ISAF Joint Command HQ (IJC) in 2011, the first SU-deployed Stabilisation Planner identified a fragmented and incoherent approach amongst stakeholders in supporting the development of Rule of Law (RoL) in Afghanistan – despite its high priority. ISAF and national military entities, key embassies and agencies in the international community, and Afghan Government bodies themselves, had limited understanding of each other's programmes and objectives, and how these could be mutually supporting. To remedy this, the SU Planner undertook a detailed mapping exercise of RoL stakeholders, and developed a Common Operating Picture (COP) of activities and progress, which combined to provide the first comprehensive overview of ROL stakeholders, activities, and relationships within Afghanistan. This work was welcomed and utilised by both civilian and military partners to bring more cohesion to RoL efforts, and ultimately led to a more focused approach to IJC support for RoL in its Campaign Plan.

Information Sharing

Returning deployees have highlighted the very large volumes of information routinely collected, collated, and held by military headquarters, often from sources inaccessible to non-military agencies. In the ISAF IJC headquarters in Afghanistan, for instance, an entire 'Information Dominance Centre' of 80+ staff was at one stage solely dedicated to information gathering and management in support of the ISAF mission. There is also often a wealth of information held by individual branches within a headquarters which can be helpful to civilian staff, and efforts should be made to talk to these branches on a regular basis in order to maintain an overall awareness of military activities and insights. **Staff should continuously seek, review, and utilise information held by their headquarters, and consider sharing with other stakeholders wherever this may be beneficial. In so doing, special attention <u>must</u> however be given to security classifications and constraints, and advice sought from military security staff before release.** Information sharing is also severely limited by IT systems, and this can be especially difficult in the relationship between higher-level headquarters and their component commands and subordinate units. You cannot always expect them to have access to the same systems (or sub-pages within the same system), or to know where to find the material if they do. Bandwidth is also a major issue. Even if the information management and IT is highly effective in your headquarters, expect to spend a lot of time trying to find documents and to spend a lot of time emailing documents back and forth.

A source of information worthy of particular note is the military intelligence element (almost invariably within J2), which can often provide valuable local insights into what is termed 'the human terrain', i.e. who is related to whom, political, ethnic, tribal and personal affiliations and tensions, and other more sensitive information. Such information can be of great assistance to civilian staff and, when undertaken with tact and proper justification, it may be possible to persuade military intelligence staff to broaden their information gathering efforts in support of civilian activities.

Conduct and Behaviour

It is important for staff to recognise that whilst on deployment in a multinational military headquarters they are essentially ambassadors for the UK, and they should demonstrate the same high levels of professional and personal behaviour expected of any UK public servant. In return, they should expect to be treated in a fair and appropriate manner by military and civilian colleagues. Any instance of unfair or inappropriate conduct or behaviour should be reported through the chain of command in keeping with local procedures, and referred to SU in the event that it is not resolved locally.

Former military staff employed as civilians can sometimes find it difficult to reconcile their new civilian status with a return to the military environment, and feedback suggests that this can occasionally result in their reverting back to a more military style of work and behaviour. Such behaviour can obviously undermine the independence and subject matter expertise which they are expected to demonstrate as civilians, and impede their credibility in the eyes of both military and civilian colleagues. It is important therefore that former military staff understand the very different roles they are employed to fulfil as civilians, and make the necessary adjustments in style and behaviour to effectively discharge their responsibilities.

Military Exercises

As mentioned in the introduction, much of the guidance and advice in this guide relates to both exercises and operations. The sophisticated nature and extent of military exercises today means that the preparation and performance of participating civilian staff must be to the same high standards as those deploying on actual operations, with their contributions equally important in preparing military formations for future deployments. Some key points relating specifically to civilian staff participation in military exercises are set out below.

- Prior to an exercise, a scenario is developed to provide a full but <u>fictitious</u> background, including detailed regional, country, political, and military information. Occasionally however, these scenarios may omit key material likely to be available within a 'real-life' situation, or differ fundamentally from what might realistically be expected from a civilian perspective. **To be effective in any role within an exercise it is essential to fully understand the scenario in advance, and base all guidance/advice on that scenario. Concerns with the realism or completeness of a scenario should be raised with military colleagues at the earliest opportunity, to ensure that the exercise is as realistic as possible.** Most military exercises will provide scenario briefing sessions and reading material in advance. If this is not the case, contact the headquarters to arrange such briefing well ahead of the exercise.
- The scenario and activities will generally cover a lengthy period (months and possibly years) but be 'played-out' over a much shorter exercise timeframe, usually 1-2 weeks. This generally results in a very busy battle rhythm and long working hours

throughout the exercise period, as staff deal with an artificially high number of scenario events, issues, and problems in exercise-constrained timeframes.

- Exercises are training events, aimed at testing the headquarters' ability to operate effectively in specific circumstances. Staff should always keep in mind therefore that their output on exercise is primarily the <u>training value and advice</u> they can offer, rather than their actual contributions to a fictitious operation. Notwithstanding this, civilian staff will form an integral part of the exercising headquarters, and should therefore ensure that their contribution is consistent with that they would offer in a 'real-life' operation. They should also seek to gain as much training value as possible for themselves, using the exercise to familiarise themselves with military structures and procedures etc.

- In addition to playing key roles within the headquarters, civilian staff can also be asked to act as external stakeholders within a scenario, or assist in exercise management or development. Staff may be asked to role-play external stakeholders during meetings, or provide subject matter expertise on likely outcomes in response to headquarters actions and initiatives - in particular the likely impacts of military operations on civilian activities. (Those undertaking such 'external' roles are often collectively known as the 'grey cell'). **Staff should, wherever feasible, ascertain their role ahead of the exercise, and prepare for it as thoroughly as possible through research and consultation.** They should however be prepared to be flexible in the roles they are asked to perform during the exercise itself.

Conclusions

There is wide agreement amongst former deployees that their work in military headquarters has been a hugely enjoyable and rewarding experience, in terms of both the contributions they have made and the resulting enhancements to their personal and professional development. However, in offering this feedback most have also highlighted the testing, challenging, and sometimes difficult nature of operating in such an environment. It is hoped that by drawing and building on the detail of such feedback, this guide will help staff prepare for, and overcome, the challenges and difficulties of working in a military headquarters, and enable them to make the very most of the unique opportunities that such a deployment affords.

Annex A: Resources and Further Information

Strategic Policy and Concept Documents

UK

Building Stability Overseas Strategy
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/32960/bsos-july-11.pdf

SU publications including the UK Approach to Stabilisation and UK Principles for Stabilisation Operations and Programmes, and the What Works Series (N.B. those on Analysis, Planning, and Monitoring and Evaluation) available at:

http://sclr.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/publications

MOD Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 3-40: Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution:
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/49948/jdp3_40a4.pdf

MOD JDP 3-90 - Civil-Military Cooperation: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/civil-military-co-operation

NATO

NATO Strategic Concept: http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/Index.html

NATO Comprehensive Approach: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_51633.htm

UN & EU

See the SU Deployee Guides to the UN and EU available at:

http://sclr.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/publications

NATO Rank Structures Charts

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ranks_and_insignia_of_officers_of_NATO_navies

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ranks_and_insignia_of_NATO_armies_officers

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ranks_and_insignia_of_officers_in_NATO_air_forces

Annex B: "At a Glance" – Checklist for Civilian Deployees

A summary of the major lessons identified and discussed in this guide is set out below. The summarised format is designed to provide staff with an easy to use checklist of actions they should consider as they prepare for and progress through future deployments, and includes cross-references to the relevant sections of the main guide. It is recommended however that the main guide be read in full in order to gain a more detailed understanding of the environment and issues likely to be encountered in a multi-national military headquarters, and how to deal with them.

Preparation for Deployment

o Refresh individual knowledge and understanding of key stabilisation principles and policy, and be up to date with latest thinking and developments ahead of departure.

o Staff with no prior experience of working in a military environment should undertake some form of military familiarisation training or education ahead of deployment.

o Reflect on personal and professional strengths and motivations for deployment, and ensure the post offers a suitable match with these. Regularly review progress against aspirations throughout deployment.

o Establish a clear understanding of the role and mission of the military headquarters, its composition, and how it fits within the broader military hierarchy and stabilisation community.

o Develop a good overall understanding of the country and region to which you are to deploy, its history and culture, and the current political, security, and stabilisation situation, including UK's broader, long term aims.

o Identify and engage with UK stakeholders prior to deployment to ascertain perspectives, gain support for the role, and reach consensus on the TOR. Resolve areas of concern and friction with SU ahead of deployment.

o Understand the level of accommodation and facilities available ahead of departure, and take clothing and personal equipment appropriate to those conditions.

o Ensure receipt and review of individual risk matrix ahead of departure, review throughout deployment, and pay particular attention to travel limitations.

In Post

o Understand, and work within, the appropriate chain of command.

o Ensure that induction to a military headquarters includes visits to and/or briefings from the staff branches outlined at Annex C.

o Understand and work within the Battle Rhythm.

o Wherever possible distil advice and briefing into clear and concise bullet-points, supported by diagrams where appropriate – brevity and clarity is key.

o Obtain a list of abbreviations and ask for explanations of those you do not understood.

o Anticipate a lack of understanding of your role and function, and be prepared to explain it and its value to military colleagues to ensure an appropriate level of contribution and engagement, together with briefings on the realities of what can be achieved by military forces in the timeframes available.

o Where possible synchronise leave and deployment dates to remain in post during and immediately after a change-over of military units.

o Review Role and Terms of Reference on a regular basis.

o Ensure arrangements are in place for completion of performance appraisal reports, and maintain an ongoing record of issues and lessons to inform end of tour brief to SU.

o Periodically review position within the headquarters.

o Undertake early and comprehensive local stakeholder identification and engagement, and 'institutionalise' stakeholder engagement wherever possible.

o Maintain awareness of the Key Leader Engagement (KLE) programme, and support KLE through comprehensive pre-briefing to commanders.

o Where appropriate, utilise stakeholder engagement to develop a 'map' or 'Common Operational Picture' of stakeholder activities to enhance cohesion and identify opportunities for military support.

o Continuously seek, review, and utilise information held by the headquarters, and consider sharing with other stakeholders wherever this may be beneficial. Special attention must however be given to security classifications and constraints before release.

Military Exercise

o Prior to participation on a military exercise, fully understand the underpinning scenario and raise any concerns with military colleagues at the earliest opportunity.

o Ascertain role ahead of the exercise, and prepare for it as thoroughly as possible through research and consultation.

Annex C: Organisation and Structure of Military Headquarters

There is no single, generic, organisational model for a military headquarters, each will vary depending on mission, national make-up, and the individual preferences of Senior Officers. There are, however, certain aspects which do tend to feature on a regular basis, and some of these more common features are described below.

HEADQUARTER BRANCHES

Many military headquarters, particularly within NATO nations, are organised along the 'General Staff' or 'Napoleonic' systems, with work divided between 9 main staff branches. In Joint-service headquarters these branches will be numbered 1-9 with the prefix 'J' or 'CJ' in a Combined Joint Command, but in single-service Army, Navy, or Air Force headquarters this pre-fix will be 'G', 'N' or 'A' respectively. Each Branch has a specific function and role within the headquarters as follows:

J1: Personnel. Encompasses all aspects of personnel management and administration, including welfare, pay, and manpower accounting.

J2: Intelligence. Gathering, analysing, and exploiting information from a wide range of sources, in order to inform the decision-making and strategic direction of the headquarters.

J3: Operations.* Responsible for the execution of broad strategic plans through military operations. This area of work is often sub-divided as follows:

- Future Operations (sometimes known as J3/5) where broad strategic plans are developed and refined to produce short-term operational plans.
- Current Operations concerned with the actual execution of operational plans.
- Joint Operations Centre (JOC) where continuous monitoring and assessment of the operational environment is undertaken to maintain full Situational Awareness (SA).

J4: Logistics. Handles the logistic responsibilities of the headquarters, which can include movement of personnel and equipment, supply of stores and equipment, and medical and catering support. The J4 branch will provide the main interface with the various military units and contractors actually delivering logistic support within an operation.

J5: Plans.* Longer-term planning beyond the remit of J3/5 (see above). J5 will produce Campaign Plans, undertake campaign assessments, and coordinate military planning with other stakeholders.

J6: Communications and Information Systems (CIS). Providing and maintaining all CIS in support of the headquarters and mission, including protected and classified telephone and computer systems.

J7: Doctrine and Training. Establishing operational doctrine, and organising/coordinating training activities specific to the mission. A major component of their work will be production and utilisation of lessons identified and learned during the mission.

J8: <u>Finance/Resource Management</u>**.** Budget and contract management, financial propriety and governance, and handling of third-party claims against military forces.

J9: <u>Civil Affairs or Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC)</u>**.** Undertakes activities to establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations with the local government, non-government organisations, and the civilian populace.

 [*The division of planning responsibilities between J3, J3/5, and J5 is often determined by timeframe. For example, J3 current operations may focus on activities for the next 72 hours, J3/5 on the following 7 days, and J5 on everything beyond that. Whatever the structure, Civilian staff should liaise regularly with all these branches to ensure that civilian activities and/or concerns are properly integrated and coordinated with military plans.]*

SENIOR STAFF

The following senior positions are likely to be encountered in most multi-national military headquarters, although precise titles and responsibilities will vary. They are often known collectively as the 'Command Group' or 'Command Team'.

The Commander (Comd): May also be called the General Officer Commanding (GOC) or Joint Force Commander (JFC), this is the Senior Military Officer with ultimate authority, responsibility and accountability for all aspects of the headquarters business. Rank can vary, but the Comd is usually a Brigadier or above, and is almost always appointed from the lead-nation within the headquarters. All major decisions and direction will emanate from this level. The term 'Commanding Officer' is not used for British formation commanders: it is always 'the Commander' (abbreviated to 'Comd'). That said, US practice even in NATO HQs is to use their national term 'Commanding General.' The term Commanding Officer (CO) in British military terminology is limited to the unit level of command, i.e. battalion and regiment and the Commanding Officer of the HQ is actually the COS, and the individual ships, regiments, squadrons assigned to the HQ will all have their own individual Commanding Officers (COs). For sub-units (company and squadron, platoon and troop), the British use the term 'Officer Commanding' (OC) to differentiate it from CO. However, for the US, company commanders are COs, not OCs.

Deputy Commander (DComd): Deputises for Comd when required, and also allocated specific responsibilities within the headquarters. The DComd is usually selected from a non-lead nation.

Chief of Staff (COS): Primarily responsible for the coordination of staff effort and efficient running of the headquarters, the COS can also be the 2nd in Command (2 I/C) when there is no DComd within the organisation. The COS is a good source of advice on working relationships and communication within the headquarters, and a useful sounding board for new ideas.

Deputy Chief of Staff (DCOS): Subordinate to the COS, there may be one or more DCOS within a headquarters, usually responsible for a broad generic area of work encompassed by titles such as DCOS(Support) or DCOS(Operations).

Assistant Chief of Staff (ACOS): Subordinate to DCOS and/or COS, there are often a number of ACOS positions heading up individual branches, sections, or functions within the headquarters, sometimes replacing the DCOS position. Heads of Individual branches might alternatively be called **'Chief'**.

Policy Advisor (POLAD): A civilian post, the POLAD is the senior advisor on international, regional and local political context, and on organisational policy issues.

Legal Advisor (LEGAD): This may be either a military or civilian position, but will be a legal expert providing specialist legal advice on issues ranging from Property Ownership to Rules of Engagement.

Regimental Sergeant Major (RSM): May also be known as the Command Sergeant Major (CSM), this is the senior non-commissioned officer within a headquarters. Responsible for discipline and the overall standard of the facilities, the RSM can be of great assistance in getting things done, particularly when faced with bureaucratic obstacles or accommodation problems.

ILLUSTRATIVE HEADQUARTERS STRUCTURE

The main components of a very simple military headquarters structure might therefore look something like this:

Such simplicity is of course very unlikely in the real world, but even the large and complex organisations now found in most international military headquarters will nonetheless have their roots in the basic model, functions, and hierarchy set out above. Terminology and titles will vary, and individual branches are increasingly being amalgamated into **Cross-Functional Teams** to achieve better-integrated staff work and avoid 'stove-piping', but the structure of

any military headquarters will always have at its heart a robust, rank-led, hierarchy capable of delivering the 9 main functions encompassed by the staff branches described above.

Civilian staff are likely to operate alongside most of these senior staff, and within many of these staff branches. Stabilisation Planners may be embedded within J3, J3/5, and J5 to better integrate stabilisation efforts and expertise with military planning, analysts may be utilised within J2 to assist in intelligence activities, and civilian specialists may support J4 and J6 branches in logistics and communications activity respectively. The POLAD will always be a civilian member of the headquarters, reporting directly to the Commander, but available for advice and assistance to other areas of the headquarters.

MILITARY FORMATIONS/HIERARCHY

The military formations directed and supported by a military headquarters will again vary from mission to mission and nation to nation, but the following brief explanations of the basic components (building blocks) of the military hierarchy may prove helpful to civilian staff with no previous knowledge of the area.

Division: A large military formation, usually consisting of between 10,000 and 30,000 soldiers. In most armies a division is composed of several regiments or brigades, and is usually commanded by a Major General.

Brigade: A major tactical military formation typically composed of 3 to 6 battalions plus supporting elements, usually commanded by a Brigadier or Brigadier General. In NATO counties a brigade will consist of between 3,200 to 5,500 soldiers.

Battalion: A military unit with 300 to 1,200 soldiers that usually consists of 2 to 7 companies and is commanded by a lieutenant colonel.

Company: Typically consists of 80–250 soldiers, usually commanded by a captain or major. Most companies are formed of three to six platoons.

Platoon: Generally the smallest/lowest echelon military unit led by a commissioned officer, usually a lieutenant. Made up of 2 to 4 Squads or Sections, a platoon can comprise anything from 9 to over 100 soldiers, depending on nationality, role and mission.

Annex D: Glossary of Military Terms

The following military terms are in common use and likely to be encountered by staff working in a military headquarters.

Battle-space: All aspects of an Operational Area within which military activities may or do take place.

Campaign: A set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve strategic objectives within a given timeframe and/or geographical area, often in concert with other agencies.

Civil-Military Cooperation: The process through which the relationship between military and civilian sectors is addressed in pursuit of a coherent military contribution to national and/or international objectives.

Centre of Gravity: Characteristic, capability, or influence from which a nation, an alliance, a military force or other civil/military grouping draws its freedom of action, physical strength, cohesion or will to fight.

Combat Support: Fire support and operational assistance provided to military combat elements.

Combat Service Support: The support provided to combat forces, primarily in the fields of administration and logistics.

Command: The authority vested in an individual to direct and influence events and to order subordinates to implement decisions.

Commander's Intent: A concise and precise statement of what a Comd intends to do, focused on an overall desired effect or outcome.

Component: A component is made up of military units organised for a particular function of an operation ie Maritime, Land, Air, Special Forces and Logistics. The context and environment of an operation will shape the size and structure of a component, and may require adjustment as the campaign develops.

Control: The coordination of activity, through processes and structures that enable a Comd to manage risks and deliver intent.

Directive: An order or instruction issued by higher authority.

Estimate: Estimates are military planning tools used to ensure a systematic and logical approach to dynamic and pressured situations, taking account of all relevant factors.

Force Protection: The measures and means employed to minimize the vulnerability of personnel, facilities, materiel, and activities to threats and hazards, to preserve freedom of action and operational effectiveness.

Formation: A specified arrangement or deployment of troops.

Influence Activities: The capability, or perceived capacity, to affect the character or behaviour of someone or something.

Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR): The prioritised integration, coordination and synchronisation of capabilities and activities to acquire, process and disseminate information and intelligence, to support the planning and execution of operations.

Joint Force Planning Group: Attended by the Force Commander and normally chaired by COS, this is the forum where progress against the Campaign Plan is analysed and measured. From this assessment will come direction on actions that can be undertaken to capitalise on favourable developments or help offset or overcome setbacks.

Joint Force: A force composed of significant elements of two or more Services operating under a single commander authorised to exercise operational command or control.

Joint Operations Area
An area of land, sea and airspace defined by a higher authority, in which a designated Joint Task Force Commander plans and conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. A Joint Operations Area including its defining parameters, such as time, scope and geographic area, is contingency/mission specific.

Main Effort: The concentration of capability or activity in order to bring about a specific outcome.

Mission Command: A style of command that seeks to convey understanding to subordinates about intentions of the higher commander and their place within his plan, enabling them to carry out missions with maximum freedom of action and appropriate resources.

Operational Command: Operational command is the authority to assign tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces, and to retain or delegate lower level control as may be deemed necessary. It does not necessarily include responsibility for administration or logistics.

Operation Order
A directive, usually formal, issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation.

Operation Plan: A plan for a single or series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. It is usually based upon stated assumptions and is in the form of a directive from higher authority to permit subordinate commanders to prepare supporting plans and orders. The designation 'plan' is usually used instead of 'order' in preparing for operations well in advance. An operation plan may be put into effect at a prescribed time, or on signal, and then becomes the operation order.

Operating Space: All aspects of a Joint Operations Area within which activities, both military and non-military, take place. *See also Joint Operations Area*.

Rules of Engagement

Directives which dictate the circumstances and limitations under which Military Forces may engage in combat with other forces.

Situational Awareness: The understanding of the operational environment in the context of a commander's mission or task.

Supported Commander: A commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by a higher authority.

Supporting Commander: A commander who furnishes forces, equipment, logistics or other support to a supported commander, or who develops a supporting plan.

Targeting: The process used to select objects or installations to be attacked, taken, or destroyed in warfare.

Theatre of Operations: A geographical area, or space, defined by the military-strategic authority, which includes and surrounds the area delegated to a Commander (termed the Joint Operations Area), within which he/she conducts operations.